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We	investigate	how	different	types	of	cultural	diversity	influence	anti-immigration	attitudes	across	Swiss	municipalities.	While	from	a	threat	theory	perspec-
tive,	a	high	number	of	immigrants	within	a	region	increases	(perceived)	threat	which	fosters	negative	immigration	attitudes,	intergroup	contact	theory	
contends	that	culturally	diverse	societal	contexts	increase	opportunities	for	contacts	with	immigrants,	which	give	rise	to	more	positive	immigration	at-
titudes.	Prior	research	on	ethnic	hierarchies	and	host	society	acculturation	attitudes	led	us	to	hypothesize	that	the	presence	of	valued,	“culturally	similar”	
immigrants	from	wealthier	countries	increases	contact	and	decreases	threat,	thereby	reducing	anti-immigrant	prejudice.	The	presence	of	devalued,	“cultur-
ally	distant”	immigrants	from	poorer	countries	should	increase	threat	perceptions	and	dissuade	contact	thus	heightening	prejudice.	A	multilevel	study	
was	conducted	using	the	2002	European	Social	Survey	(N	=	1472	Swiss	citizens,	N	=	185	municipalities).	Replicating	previous	research,	contact	reduced	
exclusionary	immigration	attitudes	through	reduced	threat.	On	the	municipality	level,	higher	proportion	of	North	and	West	European	immigrants	increased	
contact,	thus	reducing	threat.	A	larger	proportion	of	Muslims	was	related	to	an	increase	in	threat,	leading	to	more	pronounced	exclusionary	attitudes,	but	
also	to	increased	contact.	Finally,	we	discuss	how	the	impact	of	diversity	depends	on	the	social	construction	of	immigrant	categories,	respondents’	social	
position	and	ideological	stances,	and	the	prevailing	local	ideological	climate.
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1. Introduction
Switzerland is a multicultural society defined by linguistic 
diversity (four official languages: German, French, Ital-
ian and Romansh) and by a large population of foreign 
residents (over 20 percent, the highest in Europe after 
Luxemburg). As in many other European countries, im-
migration and cultural diversity are highly politicized and 
frequently under the media spotlight. A recent study shows 
that many Swiss citizens regard immigration as one of the 
country’s most pressing problems (Nicolet and Sciarini 
2006). The rise of right-wing populist parties, especially 
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), also reveals widespread 
anti-foreigner sentiment (Kriesi et al. 2005). For example, 
the SVP ran a widely publicized campaign for an initiative 
to expel immigrants who commit certain crimes or abuse 
the welfare system, regardless of their residency status 
( www. ausschaffungsinitiative.ch). Despite heavy public 
criticism from national and international organizations 
and the media, the campaign quickly collected more than 
200,000 signatures and will be voted on by the Swiss public. 
While links between cultural diversity in a region and 
prevailing immigration attitudes are widely reported, less 
is known about how the type of cultural diversity people are 
confronted with affects their attitudes. We draw on two 
well-established theoretical frameworks in the social psy-
chology of prejudice – threat theory and intergroup contact 
theory – to investigate how different types of cultural 
diversity influence endorsement of expulsion of norm-
violating immigrants across Swiss municipalities. 
This work was supported by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (100014_122407). We 
are grateful to Sandra Penic, Christian 
Staerklé, and Alain Clémence for insightful 
comments on previous drafts.
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1.1. Intergroup Contact, Threat, and Exclusionary Immigration Attitudes
Threat theory and intergroup contact theory both provide 
convincing – though competing – frameworks and empiri-
cal evidence concerning the effect of cultural diversity on 
anti-immigration attitudes. Both allow us to predict the 
impact of individual and municipal characteristics on sup-
port for expelling norm-violating immigrants from Switzer-
land. Intergroup threat and conflict theorists (Blalock 1967; 
Blumer 1958; Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Stephan and 
Renfro 2003) demonstrate that perceived threat at the indi-
vidual level underlies hostile attitudes towards immigrants.1 
In Switzerland, as in other countries, immigrants evoke 
both material and symbolic threat perceptions (e.g., risk of 
losing economic resources, cultural and value differences 
of immigrants; Falomir et al. 2004). Intergroup contact 
theorists (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), in contrast, show that 
opportunities for and frequency of contact with immigrants 
(e.g., friendships) lead to more tolerant attitudes through a 
reduction of perceived threat. 
A rapidly expanding body of research from a range of social 
science disciplines has expanded the threat and contact 
approaches to examine whether immigration attitudes are 
influenced by contextual characteristics, usually investigat-
ing the effects of country-level characteristics (e.g., Green 
2009; Quillian 1995; Sides and Citrin 2007) and more rarely 
of regional characteristics within a country (e.g., in Sweden, 
Hjerm 2009; in Germany, Wagner et al. 2006). The degree 
of cultural diversity in terms of percentage of immigrants is 
one of the most studied contextual characteristics.
From the intergroup conflict and threat perspective, a 
high proportion of immigrants increases perceived threat, 
which fosters negative attitudes towards immigration (e.g., 
Blalock 1967; Scheepers, Gisberts, and Coenders 2002; for 
the changing effect over time see Meuleman, Davidov, and 
Billiet 2009). A high proportion of immigrants may be seen 
as detrimental to the economic conditions and welfare of 
established residents (Quillian 1995), but also as diluting 
local culture and values and challenging existing social 
arrangements. Threat perceptions are likely to be enhanced 
where media reports target specific immigrant groups and 
highlight or even exaggerate the negative consequences of 
their presence using anti-foreigner rhetoric. If politicized 
and confounded with other societal problems such as crime, 
the presence of immigrants in one region of a country may 
foster threat perceptions in other parts with little or no im-
migrant population.
Intergroup contact theory, on the other hand, contends 
that culturally diverse societal contexts increase opportuni-
ties for and frequency of contacts with immigrants, giving 
rise to more positive attitudes towards them (Schlüter and 
Wagner 2008; Wagner et al. 2006). It is suggested that 
intergroup contact effects leading to a reduction in preju-
dice occur when individuals are exposed to immigrants at 
a proximal level (e.g., municipality) where immigrants and 
members of the national majority can truly interact in their 
daily activities (Wagner et al. 2006; Schmid et al. 2008).
In the current research, the type of cultural diversity within 
a region is put forward to clarify mixed findings concerning 
the effects of immigrant presence.
1.2. Distinguishing Between Different Immigrant Groups
The proportion of immigrants in a country or region is 
frequently used as a measure of cultural diversity without 
differentiating between different groups. But some immi-
grant groups are viewed more positively than others and 
enjoy a better reputation. In other words, in everyday think-
ing ethnic and immigrant groups are ranked as more or less 
attractive social partners and within society there is sub-
stantial consensus on this “ethnic hierarchy” (Hagendoorn 
1995; see Deschamps et al. 2005 for an examination of traits 
associated with different immigrant groups in Switzerland). 
“Culturally distant” immigrant groups, whose members 
may wear visible signs of cultural or religious affiliation such 
as headscarves or other attire (and are sometimes also “vis-
ible” in terms of skin colour or ethnic features differing from 
national majority), usually rank low on the ethnic hierarchy. 
1 Though various threat theories (e.g., group 
position, group threat and integrated threat 
theories) differ in underlying assumptions 
and their focus on real or perceived threat, 
they share the view that competing interests 
between groups generate conflict.
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These groups engender different reactions (threat percep-
tions and reduced desire for contact) than “culturally simi-
lar” immigrants who rank high on the ethnic hierarchy (see 
also Osbeck, Moghaddam, and Perreault 1997). We should, 
however, note that similarity can sometimes evoke threat: 
for example, where immigrants have the same vocational or 
professional qualifications as host society members, com-
petition on the job market increases (Thomsen, Green, and 
Sidanius 2008; Zárate et al. 2004). Nevertheless, European 
survey research shows that highly qualified citizens express 
more positive attitudes toward high-status immigrants than 
less educated and less skilled citizens (Hainmueller and 
Hiscox 2007), indicating that other factors apart from job 
market competition influence attitude construction.
Acculturation research has demonstrated that the national 
origin of the immigrant group affects the acculturation at-
titudes held by dominant host society members (Montreuil 
and Bourhis 2001). For instance, integration (simultane-
ous adoption of host culture and maintenance of cultural 
heritage) may be preferred for “valued” immigrants whose 
language and culture are similar to the host society, while 
assimilation (adoption of host culture and eradication of 
cultural heritage) and segregation (maintenance of cultural 
heritage, but separate from host population) are preferred 
for “devalued” immigrant outgroups whose culture and 
religion are felt to differ considerably. Similarity and value 
often also coincide with social status. Thus, “culturally 
distant” and “devalued” immigrants often have low social 
status and come from poorer countries, whereas “culturally 
similar” and “valued” immigrants come from wealthier 
countries. Findings from the ethnic hierarchy and accultur-
ation research traditions suggest that immigration attitudes 
may also vary as a function of the type of immigrants 
people are exposed to.
Evidence from survey research supports this contention. 
For example, Schneider (2008) found that across European 
countries the proportion of non-Western immigrants 
increased ethnic threat perceptions whereas the proportion 
of poorly educated immigrants was unrelated to threat per-
ceptions. Similarly, in a study across European countries, 
Hjerm and Schnabel (forthcoming) find that the proportion 
of Muslims in a country is positively related to xenophobia 
(although Strabac and Listhaug [2008] find no link between 
the proportion of Muslims in a country and anti-Muslim 
prejudice). Quillian (1995) finds that the proportion of im-
migrants from non-EC countries increases racial prejudice, 
with a stronger effect under poor economic conditions. 
This means that the presence of devalued, “culturally dif-
ferent” immigrants in a region would not increase positive 
contacts, such as friendships (despite the opportunities), 
but instead increase threat perceptions and heighten anti-
immigrant prejudice (see also Brewer 1996). Apart from the 
proportion of immigrants in general, research to date has 
mainly examined the impact of presence of devalued, cul-
turally distant immigrants. The arguments outlined above 
suggest that the presence of valued, “culturally similar” 
immigrants should increase contact and decrease threat, 
thereby reducing anti-immigrant attitudes.
1.3. Studying Support for Expulsion in Switzerland
Differentiating between immigrant groups provides a finer-
grained analysis of the impact of diversity on attitudes and 
may allow us to bridge the contrasting predictions of the 
threat and intergroup contact approaches. Muslims have 
become the targets of increased suspicion and prejudice 
(Ozyürek 2005; Strabac and Listhaug 2008; see Schneuwly 
Purdie, Gianni, and Jenny 2009 for an overview of the 
situation of Muslims in Switzerland) and are frequently 
depicted as a threat in terms of political violence and 
gender inequality (Richardson 2004). As a case in point, 
the November 2009 referendum against the construction of 
minarets received an astonishing level of support, 57.5 per-
cent of votes cast. Danaci’s analysis of the Swiss data from 
the World Value survey (2009) shows that Muslims were 
regarded as the least welcome potential neighbours (see also 
Helbling 2010).
The 2000 census shows 4.3 percent of the Swiss popula-
tion to be Muslims, most of whom (88 percent) do not 
hold a Swiss passport. For political and economic reasons, 
the number of Muslims in Switzerland increased from 
some 16,000 in 1970 to over 310,000 in 2000. (CFR 2006). 
The majority originate from former Yugoslavia, Albania, 
and Turkey. While some came for work, others fled wars, 
human rights violations, and dictatorships (CFR 2006). 
Despite the small number and diverse backgrounds of 
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Muslims in Switzerland, they are a salient group due to high 
– mainly negative – media interest and political debate, and 
recently also due to efforts by the “Muslim community” to 
form cross-cultural and linguistic organizational structures 
representing common interests (e.g., www.religionensch-
weiz.ch/islam.html). Muslims are devalued and regarded 
as a culturally different group at the bottom of the ethnic 
hierarchy (Stolz 2006; Wimmer 2004). It is important to 
note that Muslim immigrants in Europe often remain in 
low-status positions in society, suggesting that majority 
populations’ perceptions of “cultural distance” are con-
nected with institutional discrimination (Ozyürek 2005). In 
Switzerland, certain asylum-seekers from former Yugo-
slavia have lived for years with only temporary residence 
permits, which hampers integration in the labour market. 
Immigrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and Albania 
have higher unemployment rates (overall 11.9 percent) than 
the Swiss (2.0 percent; statistics for 2003, www.admin.ch/
bfs), and even among second-generation immigrants the 
majority have no qualifications beyond compulsory school-
ing (Piguet 2004).
Increasing demand for highly skilled workers in Switzer-
land has changed the pattern of immigration. Over the last 
decade highly skilled workers have arrived from neighbour-
ing countries (Pecoraro 2004), with the German popula-
tion doubling and the French population increasing by one 
third (www.admin.ch/bfs). Immigrants from northern 
and western Europe – Germany (7.75 percent of the overall 
immigrant population), France (4.25 percent), Austria (2.01 
percent), the Benelux countries and Liechtenstein (1.69 per-
cent), the UK and Ireland (1.66 percent), and Scandinavian 
countries (0.89 percent) – have unemployment rates closer 
to the local population (5.3 percent vs. 2 percent). Sharing 
traditions, religion, and often language with the major-
ity population puts them at the top of the ethnic hierarchy 
where they are likely to be regarded as culturally more close 
and valued immigrants.
Finally, Swiss immigration policy explicitly adopts a geo-
graphical classification of potential immigrants that reflects 
the distinction between culturally similar and different 
groups. While citizens of the European Union and other 
countries deemed culturally close to Switzerland are priori-
tized, immigrants from the “rest of the world” are less likely 
to be granted permits (Piguet 2004). Bilateral agreements 
with the European Union grant immigrants from EU coun-
tries largely the same rights – apart from political participa-
tion – as the Swiss have, although immigrants from new EU 
member states are only gradually gaining access to these 
rights. The strictness of immigration policy is also reflected 
in restrictive naturalization. A proposal to simplify the 
naturalization of young immigrants educated in Switzer-
land and to automatically naturalize their offspring was 
rejected for the third time in a referendum in 2004.
We use a multilevel design with the Swiss sample of the 
European Social Survey (ESS 2002, Round 1 Data) to in-
vestigate how the proportion of immigrants from northern 
and western Europe and the proportion of Muslims in 
Swiss municipalities affect perceived threat associated with 
immigrants, friendships with immigrants, and exclusion-
ary immigration attitudes. We use support for expulsion 
of immigrants who violate social norms of orderly conduct 
and hard work (i.e., immigrants with a criminal record or 
unemployed) as the indicator of anti-immigration attitudes 
because this topic has recently been the subject of political 
debate in Switzerland. Examining municipality effects is 
particularly pertinent in Switzerland, as in a decentralised 
federal state (with over two thousand municipalities and 
twenty-six cantons) political discussion and deliberation 
often take place at the local level (Horber-Papazian 2007). 
Municipalities have substantial power in the domain of im-
migration policy, for example in naturalization decisions.
The hypotheses of the current study are based on the out-
lined arguments: 
Hypothesis 1: A high proportion of culturally similar, 
valued immigrants from western or northern European 
countries in a municipality increases intercultural friend-
ships thereby reducing perceived threat associated with 
immigration and support for expulsion of norm-violating 
immigrants.
Hypothesis 2: A high ratio of stigmatized and supposedly 
culturally different Muslim immigrants in a municipal-
ity increases perceived threat and discourages intergroup 
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friendships, leading directly or indirectly to more support 
for expulsion. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between friendships with 
immigrants and opposition to expulsion of norm-violating 
immigrants is mediated by a reduction in perceived threat 
related to immigration. 
The proportions of western/northern European and Mus-
lim immigrants may also have joint effects. Cultural diver-
sity in terms of the number of different cultural groups is 
particularly high in municipalities with high proportions of 
both western/northern European and Muslim immigrants. 
It is plausible that in such a multicultural context individu-
als will frequently encounter people from many different 
countries and cultural difference therefore becomes com-
monplace and accepted. This should enhance intergroup 
friendships due to the increased opportunities and desire to 
meet people with different immigrant origins – including 
Muslim immigrants – and consequently reduce perceived 
threat and support for expulsion.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
The initial sample consisted of 1,609 Swiss citizens who 
declared no ethnic minority membership. To ensure a 
stable sample size for model comparison, missing data 
was excluded by listwise deletion, reducing the sample to 
1,472 individuals from 185 municipalities (on average eight 
individuals per municipality). The final sample consisted of 
725 men and 747 women (mean age 47 years, SD = 17). The 
respondents had on average 10.52 years of full-time educa-
tion (SD = 3.09), positioned themselves midway on the 
left-right political continuum (0 = left 10 = right; M = 4.97, 
SD = 1.84) and reported an average annual net household 
income between 45,600 CHF and 90,000 CHF (income 
was assessed with 12 categories from 1 to 12; M = 8.64, SD = 
1.96; the national average income was around 80,000 CHF 
in 2002; www.admin.ch/bfs). Missing values for political 
orientation (6.59 percent) and household income (20.70 
percent) were imputed using multiple imputations (uvis 
command in Stata, see Royston 2004). These individual-
level characteristics were included in the models testing 
our predictions.
2.2. Individual-Level Measures
Intergroup contact, perceived threat, and support for expul-
sion are the dependent variables used in this study. As the 
items making up these constructs were on different scales, 
they were linearly transformed to a 0 to 100 scale. Inter-
group contact was assessed using a self-reported measure 
of friendships with foreigners (recoded from 1 = none to 
3 = several). Perceived threat was composed of eight items 
ranging from material threats related to the economy (e.g., 
“Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by 
people coming to live and work here”) to symbolic threats 
related to norms and customs (e.g. “Would you say that 
Switzerland’s cultural life is generally undermined or en-
riched by people from other countries coming to live here”; 
α = .76). Material and symbolic threat were separated in 
preliminary analyses, but as the constructs were highly cor-
related (φ = .82, p < .001), a combined threat measure was 
used for the sake of parsimony. Finally, three items assessed 
support for expelling immigrants that violate social norms 
of orderly conduct and hard work (committing a serious 
crime, or committing any crime, or long-term unemploy-
ment) (α = .65). High scores represent higher perceived 
threat and stronger support for expelling immigrants. 
As perceived threat is often considered a component of 
prejudice (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), confi rmatory fac-
tor analyses were conducted to ensure that perceived threat 
and support for expulsion were indeed separate concepts 
(Scheepers et al. 2002). They revealed that a two-factor 
model distinguishing between expulsion attitudes and per-
ceived threat yielded a better fit (CFI = .90, RMSEA = .07, 
SRMR = .05) than a one-factor model combining both con-
cepts (CFI = .84, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .06, ∆c2 (1) = 197.42, 
p < .001), although the threat and expulsion constructs were 
related (φ =.68).2
2 Allowing for the residuals of two items of 
the threat construct (“immigrants harm the 
economic prospects of the poor” and “im-
migrants bring wages down”) to correlate 
further improved model fit, CFI = .93, RMSEA 
= .06, SRMR = .04, ∆χ2 (1) = 119.41, p < .001.
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2.3. Contextual-Level Measures
The percentage of Muslims and the percentage of immi-
grants from northern and western Europe in municipalities 
were employed as indicators of the two different types of 
cultural diversity. The average percentage of Muslims in a 
municipality was 3.94 percent (SD = 2.79; range 0 to 13.29 
percent) and the average percentage of immigrants from 
northern and western Europe was 3.26 percent (SD = 2.26; 
range 0 to 14.52 percent; United Nations classification of 
geographical sub-regions, http://unstats.un.org). Both sets 
of data were obtained from the 2000 census data of the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). Both measures were 
log transformed to correct for skewness. The proportion 
of Muslims and proportion of northern/western European 
immigrants were unrelated (r = -.08, p = .30).
Much like in other countries, exclusionary immigration 
attitudes in Switzerland are stronger in rural regions than 
in urban regions (Armingeon 2000; Trechsel 2007). As 
urban areas are typically more diverse and progressive, 
people more readily accept social diversity. Rural areas are 
less diverse and more traditional, so immigration is more 
likely to be perceived as a threat. The degree of urbanization 
of a municipality was thus controlled in the tested models. 
We constructed a variable based on SFSO coding (1 = city 
centre; 2 = agglomeration; 3 = individual city; 4 = rural mu-
nicipality) where 1 to 3 were recoded as urban, which gave us 
116 urban and 69 rural municipalities. Urban municipalities 
had a larger percentage of northern/western European im-
migrants (M = 3.83, SD = 2.26) and of Muslims (M = 4.42, 
SD = 2.55) than rural municipalities (M = 2.31, SD = 1.91 and 
M = 3.14, SD = 3.01 respectively), t(183)= -4.66, p < .001 and 
t(183)= -3.08, p = .002.
3. Results
Analyses were performed with Mplus 5.1 software in two 
steps. First, multilevel regression analyses were carried 
out, investigating the relationship between individual-level 
and municipality-level factors and each dependent variable 
separately (intergroup contact, perceived threat, support for 
expulsion of norm-violating immigrants). In a second step, 
multilevel path analyses were conducted to examine the 
predicted indirect effects of individual- and municipality-
level predictors through contact and threat. All predictors 
were standardized.
3.1. Multilevel Regression Analyses
The structure of the data is such that individual citizens 
are nested within municipalities (citizens are level-1 and 
municipalities are level-2 units in the analysis) and are thus 
not independent (Hox 2002). Multilevel modelling al-
lows testing of the part of the variation in individual-level 
dependent variables explained by municipality-level effects 
(percentage of Muslims, percentage of immigrants from 
northern and western Europe, urbanization), and the part 
explained by individual-level effects. Table 1 shows the step-
by-step improvement of goodness-of-fit statistics (i.e., model 
deviance provided by -2 * log-likelihood) when additional 
predictors were added to the model in blocks (separately for 
each dependent variable). For the three dependent variables, 
intercept models (i.e., without predictors; Model 0) were 
tested to estimate variance on both individual and contex-
tual levels. Intra-class correlations revealed that a substan-
tial part of the overall variance was due to the clustering 
structure (i.e., individuals living in municipalities): contact 
8 percent, perceived threat 13 percent, and support for ex-
pulsion 13 percent. Table 1 shows that inclusion of individ-
ual-level background predictors in Model 1 decreased the 
log-likelihood (χ2 distribution) for each dependent variable, 
indicating that the model fit was improved. In the next step, 
for support for expulsion and perceived threat, Model 2a 
revealed that adding intergroup contact to the model sig-
nificantly improved the model fit. For contact and support 
for expulsion, the inclusion of perceived threat in Model 
2b improved the model fit. Including both perceived threat 
and contact in Model 2c improved the model fit for support 
for expulsion. Model 3, adding contextual-level predictors 
to previous models, improved the model fit of each depen-
dent variable. Finally, inclusion of the interaction between 
proportion of Muslims and proportion of immigrants from 
northern and western Europe in Model 4 improved the 
model fit for perceived threat only.
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Table 1: Change in model fit for multilevel models for contact, threat, and support for expulsion 
Contact Perceived	threat Expulsion	
-2*log	likelihood ∆-2*log	likelihood -2*log	likelihood ∆-2*log	likelihood -2*log	likelihood ∆-2*log	likelihood
Model	0	
(intercept	only)
14720.94	
(df	=	0)
11740.70	
(df	=	0)
12873.64	
(df	=	0)
Model	1	
(individual	background	predictors)
14582.60	
(df	=	5)
138.34***	
(∆df	=	5)
11585.62	
(df	=	5)
155.08***	
(∆df	=	5)
12675.47	
(df	=	5)
198.17***	
(∆df	=	5)
Model	2a	
(Model	1	+	contact)
- -
11509.59	
(df	=	6)
76.03***	
(∆df	=	1)
12650.96	
(df	=	6)
24.51***	
(∆df	=	1)
Model	2b	
(Model	1	+	threat)
14504.15	
(df	=	6)
78.45***	
(∆df	=	1)
- -
12377.69	
(df	=	6)
297.78***	
(∆df	=	1)
Model	2ca
(Model	1	+	contact	+	threat)
- - - -
12375.48	
(df	=	7)
299.99***	
(∆df	=	2)
Model	3	
(individual	+	contextual	predictors)	
14476.48	
(df	=	9)
26.67***	
(∆df	=	3)	
11497.16	
(df	=	9)
12.43**	
(∆df	=	3)
12360.79	
(df	=	10)
14.69**	
(∆df	=	3)
Model	4	(individual	+	contextual	
predictors	+	interaction)
14475.38	
(df	=	10)
1.10	
(∆df	=	1)
11491.24	
(df	=	10)
5.92*	
(∆df	=	1)
12360.42	
(df	=	11)
0.37	
(∆df	=	1)
Note.	a	Comparison	with	Model	1.	
*	p	<	.05.	**	p	<	.01.	***	p	<	.001.
The upper panel of Table 2 presents the Model 4 results for 
individual-level predictors of contact, perceived threat, and 
support for expulsion. Perceived threat was associated with 
lower levels of contact with immigrants (b = -8.26, p < .001 
and b = -2.91, p < .001 with contact and perceived threat 
respectively as outcome variables), when controlled for 
individual-level background variables. Although the inclu-
sion of contact in predicting expulsion attitudes significant-
ly reduced deviance in Model 2a, the relationship between 
contact and support for expulsion was no longer significant 
in the final Model 4 (b = -0.50, p = .32). This suggests that 
the effect of contact is mediated by perceived threat (see 
3.2). Support for expulsion, in turn, was related to higher 
perceived threat (b = 8.14, p < .001). In line with previous 
research, more education and left-wing political orienta-
tion were positively related with contact with immigrants 
and negatively related with perceived threat and support for 
expulsion. Further, men, younger people, and people with 
higher household income experienced more frequent con-
tact with immigrants. Women and older people supported 
expulsion more than men and younger people. Individual-
level predictors explained 12.1 percent of individual-level 
variance in contact, 12.5 percent in perceived threat, and 
26.9 percent in support for expulsion.
The results of the municipality-level predictors included 
in Model 4 are examined next, in the lower panel of Table 
2. The main effects found in Model 3 remained almost 
identical after including the interaction between proportion 
of Muslims and proportion of immigrants from northern 
and western Europe. After controlling for the degree of 
urbanization of municipalities, the proportion of northern/
western European immigrants was positively related with 
contact with immigrants (b = 3.72, p = .001), but nega-
tively related with perceived threat (b = -1.51, p = .001), and 
negatively related, though only marginally, with support for 
expulsion of immigrants (b = -1.05, p = .08). These findings 
are in line with hypothesis 1. A larger proportion of Mus-
lims in municipalities was, in turn, related to an increase in 
perceived threat (b = .80, p = .04). However, the proportion 
of Muslims also was positively related with contact (b = 2.47, 
p = .02). Thus, hypothesis 2 was partially confirmed. Model 
4 revealed an interaction between proportion of Muslims 
and proportion of immigrants from northern and western 
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Europe only for perceived threat (b = -1.03, p = .005). Multi-
level simple slope tests (Preacher, Curran, and Bauer 2006) 
showed that proportion of Muslims was related to higher 
perceived threat only in municipalities characterized by a 
low proportion of northern/western Europeans immigrants 
(b = 1.83, p < .001; municipalities with a large proportion of 
immigrants from northern and western Europe, b = -.02, p 
= .70). Although threat was not reduced as predicted, living 
in highly diverse, multicultural municipalities seems to 
attenuate threat perceptions associated with Muslim im-
migrants. Finally, support for expulsion was lower in urban 
than in rural municipalities (b = -3.00, p = .02). Municipali-
ty-level factors explained more variance for contact than for 
perceived threat or support for expulsion, suggesting that 
high a proportion of immigrants does actually increase op-
portunities for contact. Indeed, while the model explained 
68.8 percent of contextual-level variance in contact, 54.7 
percent in perceived threat, and 61.5 percent in expulsion at-
titudes, it is important to note that a substantial part of the 
differences between municipalities for all three dependent 
variables was driven by their different socio-demographic 
compositions.
Table 2:  Individual- and contextual-level predictors of contact, threat and support for expulsion  
in Model 4 (non-standardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses) 
Contact Threat Expulsion
Intercept 52.93 (3.44) 49.24 (1.18) 62.93 (1.68)
Level	1	(individual)
	 Contact -2.91*** (0.37) -0.50 (0.50)
	 Threat -8.26*** (1.00) 8.14*** (0.53)
	 Sex	(male	=	0,	female	=	1) -3.93* (1.69) -0.09 (0.67) 2.50** (0.94)
	 Education 3.66*** (0.85) -2.35*** (0.32) -1.70*** (0.44)
	 Age -4.95*** (0.86) -0.50 (0.37) 0.92# (0.50)
	 Right-wing	political	orientation	 -1.96* (0.89) 2.18*** (0.37) 2.88*** (0.51)
	 Income 1.78# (0.97) -0.57 (0.37) -0.48 (0.50)
	 % of explained variance 12.1 12.5 26.9
Level	2	(municipality)
	 Proportion	of	northern/western	Europeans 3.72*** (1.16) -1.51*** (0.47) -1.05# (0.60)
	 Proportion	of	Muslims 2.47* (1.06) 0.80* (0.40) -0.01 (0.63)
	 Urbanization 2.39 (2.46) 0.44 (0.93) -3.00* (1.26)
	 Proportion	of	Muslims	x	
	 northern/western	Europeans
-1.07 (1.03) -1.03** (0.36) 0.34 (0.56)
	 %	of	explained	variance 68.8 54.7 61.5
	 % of explained variance without individual predictors 19.3 11.8 7.8
Note:	#	p	<	.10.	*	p	<	.05.	**	p	<	.01.	***	p	<	.001.	
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3.2. Multilevel Path Analysis
Next, following the procedure for multilevel mediation 
analyses proposed by Preacher, Zyphur, and Zhang (2010), 
we examined whether contact and perceived threat medi-
ated the effects of the proportion of Muslims and northern/
western European immigrants on support for expulsion. 
While contact, perceived threat, and support for expulsion 
were measured on the individual level, a significant part 
of their variance is due to their clustering structure. Mplus 
allows the group averages of these variables to be treated 
as latent variables (Muthén and Muthén 1998–2007), thus 
enabling individual- and contextual-level effects to be ex-
amined simultaneously. 
The multilevel path model is summarized in Figure 1. In 
order to simplify the presentation, only significant paths 
are displayed.3 On the individual level, perceived threat 
increased support for expulsion, whereas contact lowered 
threat. The direct effect of contact on support for expulsion 
on the other hand did not reach significance. Examina-
tion of the indirect effects showed, in line with previous 
research and hypothesis 3, that the impact of contact on 
lowering support for expulsion was explained by a reduc-
tion of perceived threat (indirect effect = -0.04, SE = .01, p 
< .001). On the municipality level, the mediating effect of 
threat on the relationship between contact and expulsion 
attitudes was close to significance (indirect effect = -0.26, 
SE = .16, p = .11).
On the municipality level, we found no direct effects of per-
centages of immigrants from northern and western Europe 
or of Muslims on support for expulsion after controlling for 
contact and threat. However, different mediating mecha-
nisms were revealed. The percentage of immigrants from 
northern and western Europe in a municipality increased 
contact with immigrants thereby reducing perceived 
threat (indirect effect = -1.32, SE = .62, p = .03). Further, the 
proportion of Muslims increased perceived threat which 
marginally heightened support for expulsion (indirect effect 
= 1.32, SE = .71, p = .06). No other indirect paths reached 
significance, although proportion of Muslims also margin-
ally increased contact.4
Figure 1:  Multilevel path model for contact,  
threat, and support for expulsion
Contact
Support for
expulsion
Threat
% north/west
Europeans
% Muslims
.55***
.23#
.34**
Individual-level -.21***
Municipality-level -.60*
Individual-level -.40***
Municipality-level -.63***
Note:	Standardized	path	coefficients	displayed.	Controlled	for	age,	sex,	political	orientation,	
education,	and	income	on	the	individual	level	and	urbanization	on	the	municipality	level.	
#	p	=	.05.	*	p	<	.05.	**	p	<	.01.	***	p	<	.001.	
3.3. Additional Analyses by Linguistic Region
As repeatedly reflected in referendum results on immi-
gration-related topics, stances towards immigrants are 
stricter in the German- and Italian-speaking regions than 
in the French-speaking region (see also Armingeon 2000; 
Cattacin et al. 2006). The multilevel regression analyses 
were conducted separately for the participants from the 
German-speaking part (N = 1,107) and from the French-
speaking part (N= 321) to improve the validity of our 
findings. The Italian-speaking part was excluded due to 
small sample size, N = 44 in 12 municipalities.5 Although 
the patterns were similar, some relationships did not reach 
significance in the French-speaking sample (e.g., propor-
tion of Muslims and perceived threat). This could be due to 
the small sample size.
3 According to Preacher and Hayes (2008), in order 
to avoid spurious inflations of indirect effects, even 
small values of direct paths should be included in the 
model. Thus, a saturated model was tested. However, 
also a model including only significant paths fitted 
the data well; χ2 (13) = 27.18, p = 0.01; χ2/df = 2.09; 
CFI = .98; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .03 SRMR= 0.02.
4 As Muslims and their life style have been 
shown to mainly elicit symbolic threat (Velasco 
et al. 2008), the analyses were also conducted 
with a three-item symbolic threat construct. 
The result pattern was essentially the same.
5 Note that the distribution reflects the propor-
tions of linguistic groups in the overall popula-
tion: in 2000, 72.4 percent of the population 
had German, 21 percent French and 4.3 percent 
Italian as first language (less than 1 percent had 
Romansh, see SFSO, www.admin.ch/bfs).
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4. Discussion
We find that in Switzerland a higher proportion of north-
ern/western European – valued – immigrants in a munici-
pality increases contact and indirectly decreases threat, 
thereby leading to opposition to expulsion of norm-violat-
ing immigrants. A high proportion of Muslim – devalued – 
immigrants increases perceived threat which, in turn, leads 
to support for expulsion (confirmed only for the German-
speaking region). The proportion of Muslim immigrants 
also increases intergroup contact. These findings provide 
support for both threat and contact theories, suggesting a 
beneficial impact of immigrant presence on reducing preju-
dice when immigrants are “culturally similar” and valued, 
whereas the impact of “culturally different” and devalued 
immigrants is mixed. 
On the individual level, in line with past research, perceived 
threat mediates the effect of intercultural friendships on 
exclusionary attitudes. Insofar as the data is correlational, 
firm causal claims are not warranted. Considering per-
ceived threat as a mediating variable between intergroup 
contact and prejudice is nevertheless in line with intergroup 
contact theory and with past research. Alternatively, contact 
may mediate the relationship between threat and prejudice. 
In the current study, after perceived threat was included in 
the model contact was no longer directly related to support 
for expulsion, so this reverse mediational relationship was 
not confirmed.
Our findings raise several points. First, immigrant types 
are more complex and fluid than categorization on a simple 
“cultural distance – similarity” axis can reveal (Wimmer 
2004). This dimension intersects with a number of oth-
ers, many of which are constructed in political discourse 
and lay discussion. A distinction between “old” and “new” 
immigrants is one example. The Italians, Spanish, and 
Portuguese immigrants of the 1970s are now “old” immi-
grants perceived to be part of the Swiss ingroup, as opposed 
to “new” immigrants (e.g., from outside Europe). Moreover, 
some supposedly culturally distant immigrant groups are 
perceived as willing to adapt to the Swiss lifestyle (e.g., 
Tamils), whereas others are viewed as incapable or unwill-
ing to adapt (Wimmer 2004). Yet another distinction is 
made between supposedly legitimate immigrants – those 
coming to work – and illegitimate asylum seekers and 
undocumented immigrants. Indeed, depending on the case, 
Muslim immigrants can be at either end of the described 
dichotomies (“new”/“old”, “legitimate”/“illegitimate”). 
Membership of low-status social categories is, however, a 
shared feature of the heterogeneous category of Muslims 
(Afonso 2005). Indeed, because “culturally distant” immi-
grants are often in the lowest social categories and “cultur-
ally similar” immigrants often more closely resemble the 
citizens of the host country, the threats associated with the 
two groups may also differ. While culturally distant, poor 
immigrants may be seen as threatening local values and 
burdening the welfare state, culturally similar, richer im-
migrants may be felt to threaten access to high-status posi-
tions on the job market. Defining finer distinctions between 
different immigrant groups and cross-cutting memberships 
will therefore be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Second, one must keep in mind that due to the data at our 
disposal, we were examining attitudes towards “generic” 
immigrants rather than attitudes specifically towards 
Muslims or northern/western Europeans. This shortcoming 
makes it impossible to know which groups the participants 
were thinking of when they responded to the questions. It 
is plausible that the respondents’ ideas about “immigrants” 
are partly built upon their everyday experiences. For people 
living in municipalities with a visible population of Muslim 
immigrants, images of Muslims are more likely to come to 
mind when they read questions about immigrants than for 
people living in municipalities where Muslim immigrants 
are just one group among many. This may explain why a 
high proportion of Muslims was related to higher perceived 
threat only in municipalities with a low proportion of im-
migrants from northern and western Europe. Though we 
cannot know how salient (if at all) the proportion of Muslim 
or immigrants from northern and western Europe was to 
the respondents (see Glaser 2003), the findings of the current 
study are interesting in their own right for both contact 
theory and threat theory as they reveal that the effect of 
being exposed to a specific immigrant group extends to rela-
tionships with and perceptions of immigrants in general. 
Third, in order to understand the two processes related to 
the proportion of Muslims in a municipality – the increase 
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in both intergroup contact and perceived threat – we must 
remember that contextual effects are not necessarily direct 
as individuals react differently to contextual cues. We might 
for instance assume that the presence of “culturally distant” 
immigrants triggers perceptions of threat in particular 
among people who rely on contextual cues. Danaci (2009) 
shows that the proportion of Muslims in a Swiss munici-
pality does not affect intolerance towards Muslims among 
citizens who are politically clearly conservative or liberal. It 
does, however, affect middle-of-the-road individuals with-
out a clear political stance: A higher proportion of Muslims 
in a municipality increased tolerance among moderately 
conservative individuals, whereas the opposite was true 
among moderately liberal individuals. Moreover, even when 
we examine diversity at a proximal level such as within a 
municipality, some people within the municipality will have 
more opportunities for contact with immigrants than oth-
ers, for example due to self-selection or holding similar po-
sitions at work, whereas others who lack direct opportuni-
ties for contact may perceive enhanced levels of threat. The 
impact of social position on attitudes towards immigrants 
has also been amply demonstrated (Ceobanu and Escandell 
2010). Host country citizens with low socioeconomic status 
(education, occupation, and income) are more likely than 
high-status citizens to compete for the same jobs or hous-
ing as immigrants, who generally have lower status. Thus, 
it is plausible that members of low-status categories will 
experience immigrants as more threatening (Scheepers et 
al. 2002). High-status citizens have more positive attitudes 
toward immigration, regardless of the immigrants’ status 
(Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Accounting for variation 
in individuals’ social position and ideological values when 
analyzing effects of different types of diversity opens yet 
another interesting direction for future research.
Finally, studying how the prevailing “ideological climate” 
(Sarrasin et al. 2010) affects immigration attitudes may 
help us to understand the simultaneous increase of threat 
and contact that occurs as the proportion of Muslims in a 
municipality increases. In municipalities where intolerant 
dominant worldviews legitimize negative immigration atti-
tudes, the proportion of Muslims may evoke threat, whereas 
this should not be the case in tolerant municipalities. It 
is thus necessary to examine whether shared ideological 
worldviews affect the relationship between proportion of 
Muslims and immigration attitudes. Indeed Sarrasin and 
colleagues (2010) find the lowest levels of intergroup contact 
in conservative municipalities with low proportions of im-
migrants, whereas in municipalities with a high proportion 
of immigrants, conservative climate does not affect inter-
group contact. Further research should also investigate the 
interaction between ideological climate and proportion of 
different types of immigrants in a region.
In sum, this paper underscores some pitfalls of examining 
the influence of generic diversity on xenophobia. Under-
standing how and why exposure to specific immigrant 
groups has beneficial or detrimental effects on immigra-
tion attitudes can help counteract xenophobic tendencies in 
multicultural societies.
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